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Fun, Games & Economics:
An appraisal of game theory in economics
by
Jamus Jerome Lim
“My work is a game, a very serious game.”
M.C. Escher

Abstract:

Game theory has had a profound influence on many fields of the social sciences since its
rise to prominence more than fifty years ago. This paper provides an overview of the
main concepts in game theory and studies four main areas of its application in economic
problems – oligopolistic competition, externalities & public goods, market equilibrium
and general equilibrium. The conclusion is that game theory has found a natural place in
economics and will continue to contribute to it for many years to come.
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I. Introduction
Game Theory – better described as ‘Interactive Decision Theory’ – was first thrown into
the spotlight in 1944 with the publication of von Neumann and Morgenstern’s Theory of
Games and Economic Behaviour. Although previous authors have been credited with the
discovery of game theory (Aumann 1987; Dimand & Dimand 1992; Fudenberg & Tirole
1991), von Neumann and Morgenstern firmly entrenched game theory in the realm of
economics by providing a whole new way of looking at the competitive process, through
the eyes of strategic interactions between economic agents.
This paper will aim to provide an appraisal of game theory in the field of economics. In
section II, a historical overview of the development of game theory in economics is
explored and this is followed by a quick and intuitive discussion of the central concepts
in game theory (section III). Section IV, the central focus of the paper, will discuss the
many ways in which game theory has been applied in economics, and criticisms and
future direction is touched on in section V. Section VI concludes the discussion.

II. Historical overview
The first studies of games in the economics literature were the papers by Cournot (1838),
Bertrand (1883) and Edgeworth (1897) on oligopoly pricing and production. Borel then
gave the first reasonably systematic treatment of game theory in 1921, although he did
not provide any rigorous proofs for his speculations. This was built upon by von
Neumann who went on to prove a central concept – the minimax theorem – in 1928,
before collaborating with Morgenstern to publish the Theory of Games in 1944 (Leonard
1992).
Despite the initial excitement following the publication, game theory spent a long period
in the doldrums, as economists were slow to see the importance of the theory. Game
theory was pigeonholed as a theory for the small numbers case in economics, and its
2
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popularity waned (Schotter & Schwödiauer 1980). However, in the 1950s game theory
enjoyed a revival for three reasons: first, the ascendancy of mathematical economics;
second, the widening of the field of game theory as it was applied to the analysis of
general equilibria; and third, the strong interest of the military (Leonard 1992; Schotter &
Schwödiauer 1980).
From then on, game theory grew from strength to strength. Its continued growth into the
1970s in terms of both theoretical extensions as well as widened applications in other
areas of economics proved that game theory was here to stay (Aumann 1987). The award
of the Nobel Prize in Economics to three game theorists in 1994 sealed the intimate
relationship between economics and game theory.

III. A Brief Introduction to Game Theory
Although space constraints make it impossible to provide a thorough exploration of all
the concepts of game theory, this section will attempt to cover the most important ones1.
The discussion will proceed by identifying the various forms and types of games,
followed by the main solution concepts developed to solve games.
3.1 Describing games
Games can be represented in three forms, each providing a different level of detail; the
form applied will depend on the type of analysis to be carried out. The extensive or tree
form gives a very detailed representation of the game. It consists of a complete formal
description of how the game is played, the sequence in which the players move, what

1

For a detailed explanation on the mathematical theory of games, see Luce & Raiffa’s (1957) text Games

and Decisions or Fundenberg & Tirole’s (1991) text Game Theory. For an excellent non-mathematical
introduction to game theory, see Zagare’s (1984) paper Game Theory: Concepts and Applications.
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they know at the times they must move, how chance occurrences enter the picture, and
the payoffs to each player (Aumann 1987).
A less stringent description of the rules of the game and the strategies and payoffs
available to each player is given by the strategic or normal form of a game. This form
appears as a matrix giving the strategies of players, but it loses a good deal of the
descriptive richness (Zagare 1984).
The coalitional or characteristic function form of a game is used when minimal
information is required to describe the game. It provides information about the payoffs to
a single player or coalition and little else (Aumann 1987; Schotter & Schwödiauer 1980).
A graphical representation of each of these three forms is provided in Figure 1.

Extensive/Tree form

Strategic/Matrix form
Player 2

Player 1

P1

F1

F2

2, 2

4, 1
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P2

1, 4

3, 3

Coalitional/Characteristic function form

vi(s) = max

{∑ λ x , x∈ V(S)}
I

I

where x represents an outcome,
v the value of the game &

λ an arbitrary weight

Figure 1
Games can also be classified into different types. Whether a game is cooperative and
non-cooperative would depend on whether the players can communicate with one
another. Where players can cooperate and binding agreements made, the game is known
as a cooperative game. If communication or contracting is ruled out, the game becomes a
non-cooperative one (Schotter & Schwödiauer 1980). Although cooperative games
provide an avenue for cooperation, it should be noted that players may very well choose
not to cooperate (Bacharach 1976).
Zero-sum and non-zero-sum games are used to describe games where there is the
possibility of a conflict of interest. In a zero-sum game, the interests of the players are
directly opposed, and there are no common interests. More likely, however, are non-zerosum games where shared interests exist (Fudenberg & Tirole 1991; Luce & Raiffa 1957;
Zagare 1984). Although zero-sum games may be criticised as unrealistic (Bacharach
1976), Riker (1962, p. 31) has argued that so long as a game is “perceived as requiring
indivisible victory, the zero-sum model is probably best”.
Finally, games have also been categorised into 2-person or n-person games, where n
involves three or more players. Such a distinction is important as such games are both
quantitatively and qualitatively different, and are due to the introduction of the dynamics
5
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of coalition formation between two or more players (Luce & Raiffa 1957; Zagare 1984).
As such, the approach towards n-person games is vastly different from that taken towards
2-person games.
3.2 Solution concepts
A solution concept is a function that “associates outcomes, or sets of outcomes, with
games” (Aumann 1987, p. 464) and usually provides the payoffs that the outcome(s)
yield to players. When a solution is required for a game, it is necessary to first specify the
form and type of the game under investigation.
Non-cooperative solutions involve solving for the non-cooperative or Nash equilibrium
point of the game. This basic non-cooperative solution concept may be applied to games
in both normal and strategic form, and provides a solution where each player maximises
his payoff given the other players’ strategies (Katz & Rosen 1994; Nash 1950).
Therefore, for all players i, a strategy choice s* must exist such that
Pi (s*) ≥ Pi (s*si)

for all si ∈ Si

where Pi represents the payoffs and si the strategy choice.
Non-cooperative equilibria encompass narrower solution concepts such as Zermelo’s
theorem – which states that a finite game of perfect information has a pure-strategy Nash
equilibrium (Zermelo 1913; Kuhn 1953) – as well as von Neumann’s famous (1928)
minimax theorem – that there is always a solution to zero-sum games, as well as many
others.
Cooperative solutions are designed to capture the stable outcome of a bargaining
problem. Cooperative solution concepts rest on the ideas of imputations, which are the
sets of payoff combinations that satisfies both individual and group rationality; and
domination, when an outcome can be achieved and is preferred to another by all members
in a coalition (Aumann 1987; Zagare 1984).
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The core of a game is the set of outcomes that is not dominated by any coalition (Luce &
Raiffa 1957); in a game v where the payoff that a coalition can expect is v(S), the core is
the set of feasible outcomes x which satisfies
Co(v) = ∑ xi ≥ v(S)
It should be noted that the core may be empty, that is, no core exists; this consequently
limits its usefulness, since many games have an empty core (Rubinstein 1979; Zagare
1984).
The nucleolus, Nu(v), is another solution set that chooses the set of outcomes that
minimises the maximum domination of any coalition. This solution concept is more
appealing than the core as it has been proven that the nucleolus is always non-empty and
has only a single point (Schmeidler 1969).
The von Neumann and Morgenstern solution concept is more sophisticated and
complicated than the previous two methods described. It provides a solution to the game,
NM(v), where the set of imputations satisfies two conditions: first, ‘internal consistency’,
meaning that any two imputations in NM(v) must not dominate each other; second,
‘external protection’, that any imputation not belonging to NM(v) must be dominated by
some imputation in NM(v) (von Neumann & Morgenstern 1947).
The value solution – applied to cooperative games – is the unique outcome that results
when all players behave rationally. It can be thought of as a “reasonable compromise or
arbitrated outcome, given the power of the players” (Aumann 1987, p. 469). This single
solution is the Shapley value,

φ(v)i = ∑ (n – k)!(k – 1)! / n! • [v(K) – v(K – i)]
where v(K) – v(K – i) is the marginal contribution of player i to coalition K and (n – k)!(k
– 1)! / n! is the probability that in a random formation of coalition K, player i will be the
player joining the coalition. The Shapley value can be interpreted as a solution concept
where each player is giving his or her marginal contribution (Aumann 1987; Shapley
1953).
7
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IV. Economic Applications of Game Theory
Game theory, being concerned with the behaviour of decision makers and their
interactions, seems to have limited applicability in economics, where the homo
economicus makes decisions that depend primarily on his own choices in a known way
(Hargreaves Heap et al. 1992). However, as economics moves towards maturity, it has
had to develop new techniques for the description and prediction of rational choice under
non-ideal assumptions. Game theory fills this gap perfectly, and is therefore the “natural
approach to the economics of uncertainty” (Borch 1968, p. 150).
The scope of influence of game theory in economics is considerably wide. Each subsection here will present an economic problem, followed by its game-theoretic
interpretation, and possible solutions. Space permits only a detailed examination of game
theory in the areas of oligopolistic competition, externalities & public goods, market
equilibrium and general equilibrium. Other areas only briefly mentioned are those of the
allocation of joint costs, the development of incentive-compatible mechanisms and the
development of voting mechanisms2.
4.1 Oligopolistic competition
Since an oligopoly, by definition, involves a mutual dependence of firms and recognition
of this interdependence (Katz & Rosen 1994), game theory is therefore easily applied to
oligopolistic decision making. This section will provide a study of, first, static oligopoly
models and second, dynamic oligopoly models3.

2

Specialised literature covering these fascinating areas are available, notably Shubik (1962), Hurwicz

(1960; 1972; 1973), Gibbard (1973) and Satterthwaite (1975). A quick review can be found in Schotter &
Schwödiauer (1980).
3

Friedman’s (1977) book provides an extensive study of game theory in oligopolies, while Katz & Rosen’s

textbook provides a good, non-mathematical summary of Cournot, Bertrand and Edgeworth’s
contributions, pitched at a moderate level.
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Static equilibrium models are best understood by a discussion of a Cournot duopoly,
where each firm’s strategy involves a variation of output level. Let price be given by f(Q)
(price being a function of total quantity Q), total production by q and production costs by
C. The profits for each firm is therefore
πi = f(Q)(qi) – C(qi)

where i = 1, 2

The Cournot equilibrium is represented as
πi (qc) ≥ πi (q1q2)
The vector (q1q2) reflects the interdependence of the firms’ actions, and no single firm
can have greater profits by selecting an output level other than qc (Friedman 1990;
Malinvaud 1972).
Figure 2 presents a geometric representation of the Cournot equilibrium. The Cournot
equilibrium qc occurs at the intersection of the reaction curves for each firm, shown as
q1*(q2) and q2*(q1), where a reaction curve shows the decision maker’s best strategy,
given the strategy of the other firm.
q1
q2*(q1)

qc

q1*(q2)

0

q2
Figure 24

4

Diagram adapted from Fudenberg & Tirole (1991)
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The Cournot equilibrium is a solution concept within the more general Nash equilibrium,
and the duopoly model can be extended to study other forms of Nash equilibria. The
Bertrand equilibrium involves firms varying their price level instead of output; the
Stackleberg equilibrium involves a ‘leader’ and a ‘follower’ firm, where the leader
maximises profit subject to the follower choosing according to his reaction function; and
the Hotelling solution involves firms choosing their location along a line (Forges &
Thisse 1992; Hotelling 1929; Sonnenschein 1987).
Dynamic equilibrium models involve firms and consumers meeting repeatedly under
identical circumstances. Consider two firms, labelled 1 and 2. Each firm has three
strategies, to produce ‘low’, ‘middle’ or ‘high’ quantities of output. The payoffs are
represented in the matrix labelled Figure 3.
Firm 2

Firm 1

L

M

H

L

15, 15

5, 21

5, 10

M

21, 5

12, 12

2, 5

H

10, 3

5, 2

0, 0

Figure 35
The combinations (L, L), (M, M) and (H, H) may be thought of as the monopoly, Cournot
and competitive outcomes, respectively. (M, M) would be the unique Nash equilibrium in
a single period game. However, strategies in repeated games are more complicated than
those employed in a single period game, due to the ability of firms to ‘punish’ or ‘reward’
other firms; as a result, a more collusive outcome such as (L, L) may be attained. This
equilibrium outcome of mutual benefit is the distinct advantage of repeated games
(Friedman 1971).

5

Example adapted from Sonnenschein (1987).
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Such oligopolistic games can readily be applied to studies of actual games played by
firms. For example, General Motors, after invading the low-price car market in 1921 with
the Chevrolet, engaged a two-player zero-sum game between themselves and Ford, then
the market leader with the Model T. Applying a duopolistic game situation, General
Motors played out an imaginary game which guided its actual strategies. The result was
that by the end of 1927 Ford had lost its market dominance to General Motors6
(McDonald 1975).
4.2 Externalities & Public Goods
The problems of externalities can be broadly classified into positive and negative
externalities. This section will address both forms – and their game theoretic solutions –
by way of example, illustrating negative externalities through a simple pollution problem
and positive externalities through a public goods problem7.
A traditional solution to the negative externality problem has been to assign property
rights, creating a situation where a bargaining process arises involving negotiation for
taxes and/or subsidies (Coase 1960). The problem thus becomes one of determining
imputations in the core for an n-person cooperative game (Schotter & Schwödiauer
1980).
Assume two firms, one being a factory, and the other being a farm. Externalities are
assumed to be reciprocal, meaning that pollution by the factory influences the farm and
pollution by the farm influences the factory (not unbelievable – factory waste could affect
crops, and farm pesticides could damage manufactured produce). The initial payoff
matrix for the two agents, without externalities, is shown below in Figure 4. Assuming

6

‘The Game of Business’ is the title of McDonald’s (1975) book that details many case studies of

oligopolistic games as well as other forms of games as applied to business. In fourteen chapters McDonald
guides the reader through different types of games actually played in real-world situations.
7

Examples in this section were adapted from Bacharach (1976), Fudenberg & Tirole (1991) and Friedman

(1990).
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that they have two strategies, produce low (L) or produce high (H), each player chooses
independently and payoffs are maximised at (H, H), which is the dominant strategy for
each agent.
Factory

Farm

L

H

L

9, 5

9, 8

H

16, 5

16, 8

Figure 4
However, amending the payoffs to take into account externalities, we obtain a new payoff
matrix, as shown in Figure 5.
Factory

Farm

L

H

L

6, 2

-3, 5

H

13, -7

4, -4

Figure 5
Although the dominant strategy for each firm remains as (H, H), it is no longer the
Pareto-optimal solution. The result is a prisoner’s dilemma problem, and both firms stand
to gain by slowing production to L each, but will not do so. This “lack of co-operation
results in a ‘jointly irrational’ outcome” (Bacharach 1976, p. 75). A solution to this
problem would be to devise taxes and/or subsidies that will induce the choice of (L, L) for
the firms, creating a new non-cooperative, Pareto-optimal equilibrium.
Before moving on to discuss public goods, it is interesting to note that a more
complicated problem of a similar vein did arise in Maine in the late 1960s, the principal
players being oil companies, local businesses and local residents (McDonald 1975).
In the study of public goods, the main problem is the ‘free rider’ problem, where an
individual “refrains from taking costly action because he knows that someone else will
12
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take it” (Katz & Rosen 1994, p. 234). The problem therefore becomes a non-cooperative
game of incomplete information.
Consider two players, i = 1, 2. Players decide simultaneously to contribute to a public
good, and if at least one of them contributes both players will derive a benefit of 1 and if
neither does they derive a benefit of 0. Each player’s cost of contributing is given by ci,
and the payoff matrix is shown in Figure 6.
Player 2

Player 1

Contribute

Don't

Contribute

1 – c1 , 1 – c2

1 – c1 , 1

Don’t

1, 1 – c2

0, 0

Figure 6
The payoffs to player i, given the strategy of each player si, is given by
Pi(s) = max (s1, s2) – cisi
The Bayesian Nash equilibrium is a pair of strategies (s1*, s2*) such that for each player i
and for every possible value of ci, the strategy si*(ci) will maximise expected payoffs.
Experimental evidence has supported the game-theoretic analysis of the public goods
problem in the real world. Palfrey and Rosenthal studied this problem in the University of
California, Los Angeles in 1989, utilising two players and a single public good, and
yielded similar results.
4.3 Market equilibrium

13
http://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/uauje

One of the more significant breakthroughs of game theory has been the description of
market equilibria in an n-person economy as a game. This involves describing market
exchanges as that of a cooperative game8.
The game-theoretic approach to multilateral exchange provides an alternative, better
developed theory of price determination, and although different in style of analysis from
traditional demand-and-supply theory, provides results consistent with it (Bacharach
1976). The discussion will begin with a simplified 1-seller, 2-buyer model, before
describing extensions to allow a larger, m seller-n buyer model.
Consider a single seller, A, and two buyers, B1 and B2. A is willing to sell for a (or more)
units of money while the buyers are willing to pay bi (i = 1, 2) or less. Letting (x, y1, y2)
denote the respective payoffs, the following equations may be derived.
x ≥ a,

y1 ≥ 0,

y2 ≥ 0

x + y1 ≥ max (a, b1), x + y2 ≥ max (a, b2), y1 + y2 ≥ 0
x + y1 + y2 = max (a, b1, b2)

(1)
(2)
(3)

Assume a < b1 < b2 (with little loss of generality). This would imply that equation (3)
becomes
x + y1 + y2 = b2

(4)

Substituting x + y2 ≥ b2 from equation (2) we obtain (since y1 ≥ 0 from (1))
y1 = 0

(5)

Taking x + y1 ≥ b1 from equation (2) and the result y1 = 0 we obtain
x ≥ b1

8

Examples in this section were adapted from Bacharach (1976) and Schotter & Schwödiauer (1980).
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(6)

Since y2 ≥ 0 (also from (1)), taking the result y1 = 0 and substituting into (4) gives
(7)

x ≤ b2
The final three equations (5)-(7) completely represent the core solution concept. The

payoffs to the core represent the price, and it falls between b1 and b2. The core solution,
therefore, determines the market outcome (Bacharach 1976).
Geometrically, the core corresponds to the range AB in the supply-demand diagram
shown in Figure 7.
p
b2

Supply
AA

b1

B

B

a
Demand
0

q
Figure 7

This example can easily be extended to deal with a case of m sellers and n buyers. The
Pareto-efficient core can once again be calculated. A schematic representation of the core
of an economy with Am sellers and Bn buyers will yield price p, which falls between the
highest supply price ak and the lowest demand price bn-k+1. Figure 8 illustrates this result.
a1

a2

ak

am-k

am-1

am

p

b1

b2

bn-k-1

bn-1

bn

Figure 8
The primary advantage of utilising a game representation of markets lies in the fact that
markets that do not fulfil some of the neoclassical assumptions (such as convexity of
15
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preferences or absence of externalities) are still amenable to analysis (Schotter &
Schwödiauer 1980).
4.4 General equilibrium
This section will move on to describe general Walrasian equilibrium in a competitive
exchange economy as a non-cooperative Nash equilibrium in a game of complete
information. The assumptions here are that agents know the rationing scheme and send
market trade offers which, given other agents’ trade offers, result in a payoff of preferred
final transactions for each agent9. Three general conditions must be fulfilled before to
prove that competitive equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium. They are, for i players:
Condition 1. The payoff of player i is continuous in all strategies and concave in
the strategy of player i; and the demand for a good tends to infinity as the price of
the good tends to zero.
Condition 2. The strategy set of an individual player is chosen so as to maximise
utility subject to his or her budget constraint.
Condition 3. The strategy sets of other players are chosen such that no alternative
agreement would yield higher payoffs simultaneously for all players.
In short, condition 1 ensures market clearing, while the other two ensure that the Limit
Theorem – that trades are efficient and utility maximising – holds (Friedman 1990).
Figure 9 and 10 illustrate conditions 1 and 2 & 3, in a 2 player-2 good context.
y
f(x2)
f[λx1 + (1 – λ)x2]

λf(λx1) + (1 – λ)f(x2)
f(x1)
9

This discussion draws heavily from the work of Arrow & Debreu (1954), as described in Friedman

(1990), and Bacharach (1976). 0

x1

λx1 + (1 – λ)x2 x2

x
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Figure 9

C’

Good 2

0
Player 2

e
C

u1*

Player 1

u2*

Good 1

0

Figure 10
There are certain advantages of utilising a game representation of general equilibrium.
First, modelling the problem in the form of a game provides the ability to distinguish
between feasible and equilibrium actions; and second, it allows the introduction of
institutional arrangements into the analysis of general equilibria (Schotter & Schwödiauer
1980).
4.5 Other applications
A few other applications of game theory within the field of economics merit brief
mention. Game theory has helped in the allocation of joint costs, providing attractive
core, nucleolus and value solutions. Practically, this has been applied to the study of
pricing for public utilities such as sewage and water in several municipalities in Hungary
(Bogardi & Szidarovsky 1976).
Game theory has also been applied to the development of incentive-compatible
mechanisms and institutions, used to improve allocative efficiency; as well as strategy
17
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proof voting mechanisms, to ensure non-dictatorial and Pareto-optimal Nash outcomes
(Schotter & Schwödiauer 1980).

V. Criticisms & Future Direction
Criticisms have been levied against game theory, and two in particular are worth noting.
First, game theory is sometimes judged to have failed, because some games possess
solutions and others do not, and those that do have solutions sometimes provide too
many. Here Bacharach (1976) argues that the failure of game theory to give unambiguous
solutions to certain classes of games does not imply flaws or inadequacies in the theory,
just that it is the nature of things. We cannot expect a unique, rational answer all the time
in a complex, possibly irrational world. Second, there is the argument that game theory
contorts the way individuals view the world, as one of selfish interactions. However,
game theory in itself “has no moral content, makes no moral recommendations, is
ethically neutral” (Aumann 1987, p. 497). It studies selfishness, it does not recommend it.
However, on the whole the future of game theory is bright. Recent developments of game
theory in economics include the discovery of new Nash equilibria (such as the Markov
equilibrium used to study the common resource problem); refinement of equilibrium
concepts (such as the stability concept used to study signalling in markets) and
evolutionary game theory, an exciting new field studying social conditioning and
behaviour selection (Cho & Kreps 1987; Levhari & Mirman 1980; Weibull 1995).

VI. Conclusion
Just as mathematics has carved itself a niche in economics – making it seem unthinkable
that a modern economist isn’t at least familiar with basic mathematical economics –
game theory has also found itself with a definite role to play in economic analysis.
Instead of the limited neoclassical analysis that is tied to only one institutional framework
– competitive markets – game theory offers a more flexible analysis of economic
problems that includes institutions as well. Its increasing pervasiveness in basic textbooks
is a testament to this fact (Bacharach 1976, Schotter & Schwödiauer 1980).
18
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